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COLLEGE EDUCATION A NECESSITY
Mitchell v. Mitchell
170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396 (1960)
A divorce decree awarding to the wife custody of and support for five
minor children was entered by the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County in 1953. In 1958, the court, upon motion filed by the wife, modified
the original support order and provided for additional support including
the sum of five hundred dollars per year payable by the husband to the
wife for each of the minor children electing to attend any accredited college.
The court of appeals reversed that part of the judgment pertaining to the
order of payment for college.' The supreme court reversed, holding that it
was no abuse of discretion as a matter of law for the trial court to order
payments by the father for the college education of the minor children.2
Under common law and by statute there exists a parental obligation of
providing support for minor children which is ordinarily limited to the
necessaries.3 Whether a college education was such a necessity was first
decided in Middlebury College v. Chandler,4 in which a suit was brought
by the college to recover tuition and other bills from a minor child repre-
senting the expenses of his college education. The court held such an edu-
cation not to be a necessity for which an infant can render himself abso-
lutely liable by contract, stating:
Though more extensive attainments in literature and science
tend greatly to elevate and adorn personal character, are a source
of such private enjoyment and may justly be expected to prove of
public utility, yet in reference to man in general, they are far from
being necessary in a legal sense. The mass of our citizens pass
through life without them.5
The rationale of the Middlebury opinion, though applied to a situation
not involving divorce or support orders, partially explains some courts'
refusal to award college payments as part of support orders in divorce
decrees. 6 Minimum compulsory education requirements 7 and the discretion
I Mitchell v. Mitchell, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 88, 158 N.E.2d 546 (Ct. App. 1959).
2 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 170 Ohio St. 507, 166 N.E.2d 396 (1960).
3 Ohio Rev. Code § 3109.05. "The court may order either or both parents to sup-
port or help support their children. . . ."; Ohio Rev. Code § 3103.03. "The husband
must support himself, his wife, and his minor children out of his property or by his
labor .... "; Hopkins v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 1944). "Under the
laws of Ohio the duty of the parent to support his infant child extends to necessary
support which includes food, clothing, education, medical care and a suitable residence,
all according to the father's means."
4 16 Vt. 683 (1844).
5 Id. at 686.
6 Infra note 17; Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1930); Strayer
v. Strayer, 26 N.J. Misc. 218, 59 A.2d 39 (Ch. 1948) (dictum).
7 Halsted v. Halsted, 228 App. Div. 298, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (1930). "Unlike the
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enjoyed by non-divorced parents in decisions as to their children's higher
education s have been cited as crucial factors in the courts' refusal to include
a college education in the class of necessities.
The courts of other jurisdictions, however, cognizant of modern day
requirements for specialized training and aware of the frequent denial of
opportunities to children as a result of their parents' divorce, have classified
a college education as a necesssity to be considered in the awarding of sup-
port orders when circumstances justify such a decision.9 Providing no uni-
versally applicable standards, the decisions take into account the intelligence
and aptitude of the child'0 and the father's ability and means to pay for
such an education."1
This question was decided recently by an appellate court in Illinois,1 2
holding that, "Where the father is of ample means, . . . education beyond
the high school level for children of average or better scholarship . . . is
regarded as a necessity."'13 The circumstances of the parties in a case which
was decided at the same time by the Supreme Court of Indiana led the
court to reach the opposite conclusion.' 4 In addition to the father's modest
means, the court stressed the fact that the Indiana legislature had met six
times without acting after an earlier decision had ruled that a college educa-
tion was not a necessary and the father could not be compelled to support
his college-age minor son.15
Until the Mitchell case, there was no Ohio Supreme Court holding on
furnishing of a common-school education to an infant, the furnishing of a classical or
professional education by a parent to a child is not a necessary within the meaning
of that term in law."
8 Commonwealth v. Wingert, 173 Pa. Super. 613, 98 A.2d 203 (1953); However, in
Commonwealth ex rel. Stomel v. Stomel, 180 Pa. Super. 573, 119 A.2d 597 (1956), the
court held that though the father, even if financially able, is not required to furnish
a college education, he must pay for public education beyond the minimum compulsory
level.
9 Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860, 872, 33 A.L.R. 887 (1941).
"Ordinarily, a child of divorced parents is in greater need of the help that a college
education can give than one living in a home where marital harmony abides."
10 Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); Esteb v. Esteb, 138
Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264, on rehearing 246 Pac. 27, 47 A.L.R. 110 (1926).
11 Hart v. Hart, 239 Iowa 142, 30 N.W.2d 748 (1948); Titus v. Titus, 311 Mich.
434, 18 N.W.2d 883 (1945); Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949)
(dictum).
12 Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959).
13 Id. at 843.
14 Haag v. Haag, 163 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1959).
15 Hachat v- Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947). This line of
reasoning, so often used when the court lacks the conviction to decide a question of
public policy was aptly attacked in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District N.
302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (1959). "The doctrine . . . was created by this
court alone. Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present
conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty, to abolish that
[doctrine] . . . We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and we can
likewise open them."
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this precise issue. Where support for a college education was included in a
separation agreement later incorporated into a divorce decree, the court did
enforce these payments on the basis of the father's contractually expressed
desire to furnish a college education for his children, the question of the
necessity not being considered. 6 When no such agreement was present, an
early appellate decision had held that, "the parental obligation to furnish
necessaries does not comprehend a college education.' 1'
Immediately prior to the Mitchell decision, the Juvenile Court of Cuya-
hoga County expressly held that a college education was a necessary where
the mother, who had custody of the child, believed that the latter possessed
the proper aptitude and desire to attend college.' 8 At first blush this lower
court holding would appear to have anticipated the supreme court's ruling
on this issue, and that, by virtue of the Mitchell decision, the Ohio law is
now such that a college education is to be considered a necessity for which
provision is properly made in support orders. The court emphatically stated,
however, that their decision was based only on the "determination that the
trial court possesses the discretionary power to decide whether under given
circumstances a certain parent may be required to provide or contribute
to a college education for his child."'19
This express declaration by the supreme court neglected to provide
any standards or guides for the lower courts to follow in applying their
"discretion." Nevertheless, because of the "qualified necessity" standard
employed elsewhere,20 and the reference to the "given circumstances" in the
decision itself, perhaps, the court has, by implication, set forth similar limi-
tations. Thus, Ohio joins these other states in the recognition of changing
national and world conditions and the requirements needed to meet them.21
Gerald H. Swedlow
16 Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958).
17 Wynn v. Wynn, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 450 (Ct. App. 1928).
18 Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959).
19 Id. at 510.
20 Supra notes 10 and 11.
21 Supra note 18, quoting Thomas Jefferson: "I am not an advocate for frequent
changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered, institutions must advance also to
keep pace with the times."
1960]
